Forthcoming in 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. __ (2009).
Privilege-Wise and Patent (and Trade Secret)-Foolish?:
How the Courts’ Misapplication of the Military and State Secrets Privilege
Violates the Constitution and Endangers National Security
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I. Introduction
When New England inventor Philip French had his epiphany 15 years ago, he didn’t
dream it would lead to an invention that would be pressed into service in a top-secret
government project, or spawn an epic court battle over the limits of executive power. He
was just admiring a tennis ball.1
The story behind the Federal Circuit’s 2006 decision in Crater Corporation v. Lucent
Technologies appears to be one of duplicity, culminating in the exploitation of French and two
other inventors by the Navy and its contractor, Lucent.2 At the behest of Lucent, the three
inventors had shared their patented technology and trade secrets. After enthusiastically
pronouncing their technology ideal for its naval project, however, Lucent denied compensation
to the inventors. When they sought legal recourse, the Federal Circuit torpedoed their claims by
applying the “Military and State Secrets Privilege” (Privilege). The decision created several
serious problems, including a likely constitutional violation and a long-term threat to national
security. Yet the Crater court failed to address either of these problems, which are increasingly
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likely to arise in light of the government’s burgeoning use of the Privilege.3 This Article
examines these problems and suggests an alternative approach to applying the Privilege.
Few disagree with the need for the Privilege, which shields information that could
endanger the security of the nation from public exposure.4 Unfortunately, the Crater court not
only recognized the Privilege, but also relied on it to preclude the plaintiff from obtaining any
meaningful discovery from Lucent and the Navy, effectively and unnecessarily shutting down
the judicial process.5 By permitting the Privilege to extinguish the plaintiff’s claims, the Crater
court triggered two concerns. First, rulings such as Crater prevent inventors from obtaining
compensation when the government engages in unconstitutional “takings” of their trade secrets.
This by itself should have given the Crater court pause. Second, the destruction of inventors’
claims discourages military-related innovation.
Most significantly, the primary casualties of this approach are individual inventors and
small companies, both of whom tend to be unfamiliar with the defense-industrial complex. This
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outcome runs counter to the Department of Defense’s recently stated desire to expand
procurement beyond the traditional large-company industrial base to increase access to cuttingedge communication and computer technology crucial to national security.6 Yet, as demonstrated
in Crater, powerful companies are the ones that benefit from a court’s misapplication of the
Privilege; this benefit stems from the knowledge that the Privilege gives them immunity from
stealing individuals’ and small business’ innovations for military use. Thus, as one commentator
noted, this case is “an especially pointed . . . lesson for [smaller] inventors who are
contemplating approaching a company or others regarding licensing their technology,” as well as
a signal that long-term government goals can be taken hostage by short-term litigation strategy.7
This Article argues that an alternative strategy to the Federal Circuit’s approach would
avoid both the constitutional takings problem and the unnecessary encumbrance on the nation’s
defense goals. Rather than permitting the Privilege to result in an absolute concealment of
information, courts should, where possible, apply more limited procedural safeguards that could
protect sensitive information. In many situations, information could be divulged to the plaintiffs
without wholesale public disclosure, permitting the case to proceed.
Part I of this Article describes how the Crater plaintiffs came to sue in federal court, and
illustrates how more sophisticated commercial actors can take advantage of small inventors. This
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is accompanied by a discussion of how the development and evolution of the Privilege led to the
Crater decision. In Part II, the Article considers the Takings Clause violation emanating from
Crater’s destruction of the value of the inventors’ trade secret, as well as the possibility of an
analogous violation of patent rights. Part III explains that the damage is not limited to a purely
legal injury; destroying the value of an inventor’s efforts will discourage the technological
innovation that the government has stated will be key to our nation’s future defense plans. In
light of the aforementioned problems, Part IV concludes that courts should, whenever possible,
reject the government’s attempt to suppress the designated information. Instead, courts should
decide how to apply the Privilege only after taking into account both the nature of the privileged
information involved and the effect of limited access to it. Finally, the Article outlines some lessrestrictive protective measures that courts could apply. A bill currently under Senate
consideration, the State Secrets Protection Act, proposes some of these measures.8 However, this
Article argues that those measures do not go far enough in allowing an inventor’s claims to
proceed in court. Courts should permit the dismissal of these claims only when no sufficiently
protective procedural measures exist, because it is only in these circumstances that courts avoid
both the takings problem and the unnecessary constraint on the incentive to invent.

II. Crater Corporation v. Lucent Technologies Corp.
A. The Story of the Grab for an Individual Inventor’s Technology.
The story of Crater Corporation is a cautionary tale for inventors (particularly individual
and small-business inventors) of devices with potential military applications. In 1991, Philip
French and his co-inventors, Charles Monty and Steven Van Keuren, filed a patent application
on a coupling device that links pipes or cables together without other complicated and expensive
8
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mechanisms.9 They were having little success marketing their invention until they developed a
commercial relationship with Lucent Technologies, a subsidiary of AT&T.10 Lucent expressed
an interest in obtaining a prototype of the mechanism so that it could evaluate it for use as an
airtight “wetmate” in underwater fiber optic networks.11 Lucent explained that, if appropriate, the
device would be used to fulfill a classified contract with the United States.12 Lucent sought both
access to the inventors’ undisclosed engineering drawings as well as a license to use the
drawings to produce a prototype for research and development purposes.13 According to the
complaint, the inventors agreed to provide both an R&D license and the drawings; in return,
Lucent agreed to keep the drawings secret, to negotiate another license agreement if they were
interested in using the device in their network, and to provide the inventors with computerassisted drawings of the technology.14
Shortly thereafter, Lucent rejected the inventors’ request for CAD drawings of the
coupler on the grounds that the inventors lacked the necessary security clearance required for
access to the classified Navy project.15 Nevertheless, the inventors were presumably excited to
learn that Lucent’s suitability testing indicated that the coupler was the best device for the
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project.16 They were less excited, however, when Lucent offered only $100,000 to license the
technology.17 In May 1998, the inventors’ corporation (Crater) filed a lawsuit alleging patent
infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, and breach of contract.18
In order to establish their patent infringement claim, Crater had to demonstrate that
Lucent had fulfilled its government contract by manufacturing and using a device that fell within
the scope of the patent.19 By contrast, the trade secrets misappropriation claim required a
demonstration of a disclosure of the inventors’ confidential information to the government, even
in the form of a non-infringing coupling.20 To succeed on these claims, however, Crater would
have had to either demonstrate that Lucent made some use of the inventors’ patented or
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confidential information (the former for patent infringement, and the latter for trade secret
misappropriation) to develop or produce the coupler, or demonstrate that Lucent shared this
information with the government. Accordingly, the inventors sought discovery from Lucent and
the government regarding their agreement and the nature of Lucent’s coupler.21
Crater did not get far into litigation, however, when in August 1998, Lucent moved for
dismissal of the patent infringement claim on the grounds that 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) immunizes
government contractors from patent infringement.22 Section 1498 does not eliminate an
inventor’s ability to seek compensation for use of their patented inventions, however; instead it
shifts liability directly to the government and expressly authorizes suits against the government
for any such infringement.23
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In September 2001, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal of the patent
claim.24 As of 2007, Crater’s 1498(a) administrative claim before the Department of Defense
was still pending.25 Since 1498 only applies to patent claims, Crater could continue suing Lucent
under the trade secret and contract claims. Once the circuit court decided the 1498 issue and the
district court litigation resumed on the remaining claims, Crater tried to obtain previouslyrequested information regarding Lucent’s coupler.26 However, Crater found itself stymied on
these claims as well. The government acknowledged that Lucent made 36 Crater-based
prototypes for research and development, but claimed that these prototypes were rejected for use
in the project.27 Additionally, the government (having intervened in March 1999) asserted that
neither it nor Lucent would produce information showing the selected design, because such
information fell within the scope of the Privilege.28
The Privilege emanates from common law, most directly from a series of nineteenth
century evidentiary rulings involving government concerns that “were woven together under the
umbrella concept of a multifaceted ‘public interest’ privilege, some aspects of which were
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referred to under the subheading of ‘state secrets.’”29 The justification for the Privilege rests on
the notion that the government possesses the right to shield information from the public when
disclosure of such information would endanger national security (by permitting foreign entities
to learn about the country’s military operations or diplomatic endeavors).30 As one court
described it, the Privilege is “the assertion of a paramount government right, the inherent right of
self-preservation for purposes of national defense.”31 Under early United States common law, the
Privilege was a generalized “public interest privilege” that covered communications between
private informers and government officials (the informer’s privilege) and intra-government
communications (the deliberative process privilege), as well as communications related to
national security and foreign relations (the military and state secret privilege).32 As now applied,
the Privilege is used to protect the country’s defense functions, intelligence-gathering methods
and abilities, and foreign diplomatic relations.33
While the Supreme Court formally recognized the Privilege in 1953,34 the progenitor to
the Privilege developed in the lead-up to and midst of the two world wars. In this period, weapon
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innovation became a more important facet of military power than ever before. Although
technology has always acted as a “force multiplier,” the ability of the military industrial base to
provide consistent innovation and progress in military technology became crucial to warfare in
the twentieth century.35
In World War II, the ability of combatants to produce technologically advanced
equipment and use it on the battlefield often meant the difference between victory and defeat.36 It
is no surprise, then, that the first 20th century case in which the Privilege was invoked (as well as
two cases immediately prior to World War II) involved patent litigation by inventors whose
devices had been allegedly used without authorization by the military or its contractors (armorpiercing projectiles in the first, apparatuses relating to gun-sighting in the later two).37 While two
of these cases involved claims brought against the government under 1498 (or its predecessor),
one case was a private patent suit in which the government intervened in order to invoke the
Privilege, much like Crater.38

Supreme Court reversed the decision (which had been affirmed by the Third Circuit), and remanded the
case to the trial court. Id. at 12.
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B. The Application of the Privilege in Crater
The government’s strategy in district court was straightforward: assert the Privilege for
almost every document that the plaintiff sought to discover. The government asserted the
Privilege for over 26,000 documents, including all information involving whether or not any
version or derivative of the Crater coupler was used.39 To properly assert the Privilege, the head
of the governmental department with authority over such information must formally invoke it
and provide a declaration explaining the reason that national security would be at risk if the
designated information were disclosed.40 The government purportedly satisfied this requirement
by submitting two declarations (one classified, one public) through the Secretary of the Navy.41
The Navy’s public declaration merely stated that the documents had been reviewed, and that the
government had concluded that discovery proceedings could potentially provide classified
information to U.S. adversaries. Furthermore, the public declaration stated that such disclosure

the government that could not be disclosed without detriment to the public interests.” Id. at 354.
Upholding the government’s assertion of the Privilege, the court not only denied Firth’s motion to compel
the testimony, but impounded Firth’s exhibits. Id. at 356.
39
Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 423 F.3d 1260, 1263-64 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that the
Government indicated that the concern was based on the possible disclosure of “information relating to
the manufacture or use of [Crater’s] coupling device, or any coupling device, by or on behalf of the
United States”).
40
Id. at 1265-66. In Reynolds, the Supreme Court had stated that invocation should only be made “after
actual personal consideration by that officer.” United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953). But the
Crater court concluded that this “personal consideration” did not demand that the department head
personally review all of the information and documents sought. Crater, 423 F.3d at 1266. Although the
Crater court did not elaborate, presumably the requisite consideration can be satisfied by the department
head’s personal consideration after being briefed by subordinates who reviewed the information and the
security concerns. See Clift v. United States, 597 F.2d 826, 828-29 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that the
Privilege was sufficiently invoked by a mere Admiral’s review of the documents, the Secretary of
Defense Richard Chaney’s declaration of review of the Admiral’s affidavit and a sample of documents).
The court noted, however, that “the Government would be wiser not to put courts to this test in the
future.” Id.
41
Crater, 423 F.3d at 1263-65.There were private and public versions of each of the declarations: one
from Richard J. Danzig, then-Secretary of the Navy, and one from Acting Secretary of the Navy Hansford
T. Johnson. Id.
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could enable these adversaries to defeat U.S. military operations and gravely harm national
security.42
The district court first attempted to address the Navy’s concern by conducting an in
camera inspection of the designated documents.43 Given the vast number of documents, it is
difficult to imagine that the court carefully considered each one’s significance. Nonetheless, even
a cursory review revealed that certain documents, such as publicly available court records, were
not protected by the Privilege; as a result, the district court ordered a disclosure of such
documents.44 The government resisted disclosing even these documents, which prompted the
court to order a “show cause” hearing regarding the use of the Privilege.45 After the hearing, the
court announced that even if the disputed documents were disclosed, the Privilege had indeed
been properly invoked regarding specific documents that were crucial to proving the plaintiff’s
case.46 As a result, not only did the district court prohibit the inventors from conducting any
further discovery related to the manufacture or use of their invention, the court also concluded
that:
While Crater need not prove the government’s intended use of the device, there is
no way that Crater can prove misappropriation without showing that the
defendants somehow incorporated Crater’s design information into the classified
government device. Because the protective order and the government’s proper
assertion of the state secrets privilege prevents Crater from discovering any
evidence relating to this claim, Crater is unable to make out a prima facie case of
misappropriation of trade secrets. Similarly, all of Crater’s breach of contract

42

Id. at 1263 (offering assertions by the government that compelling the government to turn over those
documents “would permit potential adversaries to adopt specific measures to defeat or otherwise impair
the effectiveness of those operations and programs,” and “reasonably could be expected to cause
extremely grave damage to the [country’s] vital national security interests”).
43
Id. at 1264.
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Id. at 1265.
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Id.
46
Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., No. 4:98CV00913 ERW, 2004 WL 3609347, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Feb.
19, 2004).
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claims except one require Crater to prove what the defendants did for the
government.47
Lucent took no formal position on the propriety of the Privilege, but argued that its
application would make it impossible to produce adequate evidence for a defense.48 The district
court agreed, declaring that even if the plaintiffs could somehow present a prima facie case, the
government’s invocation of the Privilege unfairly prevented Lucent from defending against
Crater’s claims.49 As a result, the court concluded that the most just solution was to dismiss
Crater’s remaining misappropriation and contract claims.50
Considering the decision on appeal, the Federal Circuit began its analysis by
acknowledging that the Supreme Court has previously indicated that the Privilege is “not to be
lightly invoked.”51 Nonetheless, without even reviewing the documents themselves (relying
instead on the lower court’s decision, the government’s declarations, and the parties’ briefs), the
Federal Circuit upheld the government’s invocation of the Privilege for all of the documents.52
Even more alarming was its intimation that, although such a remedy was “harsh,” the district
court was likely correct in dismissing the claims (because the claims could not prevail without
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Id. at *3.
Crater, 423 F.3d at 166 n.2.
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be protected. Id. at 1265-66. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, finding it sufficient that the
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security. Id. at 1266; cf. Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 9-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (refusing to accept
Attorney General’s privilege claim in the absence of “an explicit representation” that he personally
reviewed the material).
48
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the privileged information).53 Nonetheless, the case was remanded for further consideration.54 On
remand, the district court found insufficient evidence to support Crater’s claim that Lucent used
the invention outside of the research and development prototypes and granted summary
judgment to Lucent.55
While formally concurring in part and dissenting in part, Federal Circuit Court Judge
Newman found several significant problems with the majority opinion. She began by
disapproving of the decision to uphold the Privilege without reviewing the disputed information
in light of the Supreme Court’s requirement that reviewing courts must determine for themselves
whether the Privilege was appropriately claimed.56 The failure to do so was particularly troubling
to Judge Newman because she appeared to be skeptical that the government had used the

53

Crater, 423 F.3d at 1267 (“Although harsh, the presence of a properly invoked state secrets privilege
requires dismissal of [a] claim that cannot prevail without the privileged information.”) (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1006, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
54
Although the court recognized that “the record as it pertains to Crater’s state law claims is not
adequately developed,” it then reviewed the claims (as indicated in the pleadings and briefs), and
concluded that “as far as we can tell, it has not been established precisely what, if any, trade secrets exist
in connection with the Crater coupler,” or “whether, under Missouri law, there was a contract between
Crater and Lucent and, if there was a contract, what its terms were.” Id. at 1267-68.
55
Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., No. 4:98CV00913 ERW, 2007 WL 4593500, at *13 (E.D. Mo.
Dec. 28, 2007). In opposition to Lucent’s motion for summary judgment after this remand, Crater
apparently changed its theory of recovery from a trade secret misappropriation claim to a “Submission of
Ideas” claim available under New Jersey common law. Id. at *12. That claim required proving that: “(1)
the idea was novel; (2) it was made in confidence, and (3) it was adopted and made use of” by the
defendant. Id. Whereas establishment of a “trade secret” requires proof of other commercial use of the
information by the owners prior to its alleged misappropriation, misuse of an “idea” does not. Id. On
remand, it was undisputed that the Crater inventors had not sold or commercially used the coupler
technology other than in regard to its dealings with Lucent. Id. at *3. “When trade secret claims do not
meet the Restatement’s ‘use in business’ requirement, they are treated as submission-of-idea cases.” Id. at
*12 (citing 49 NEW JERSEY PRACTICE, BUSINESS LAW DESKBOOK § 15:4 (Brent A. Olson et al. eds,
2007)). Nonetheless, when the Federal Circuit addressed the Privilege issue in 2006, it treated the
inventors’ information as potential trade secrets. Accordingly, this article analyzes the merits and
problems of the circuit court’s decision assuming that the inventors’ information would indeed constitute
trade secrets. See infra note 68.
56
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8; Crater, 423 F.3d at 1270 (“None of us on this panel has inspected any of the
information for which the claim is made.”); see also Molerio v. F.B.I., 749 F.2d 815, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(“To some degree at least, the validity of the government's assertion must be judicially assessed.”).
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Privilege appropriately, a skepticism fomented by several factors.57 First, Judge Newman
proclaimed that the government’s declarations failed to sufficiently describe the nature of the
documents and to identify the individual who reviewed these documents.58 As a result, the court
did not know whether the documents truly contained sensitive data. Further, the court was unable
to ensure that the reviewer understood both the scope of the Privilege and the government’s
obligation to redact and separate sensitive information, producing the remaining non-sensitive
information where possible.59
Second, Judge Newman observed that it was apparent that little or no effort was made to
ensure that the Privilege was being used only on material that, if disclosed, would be a threat to
national security. She noted that among the 26,000 purportedly “privileged” documents were
items already in the public record.60 This violates the tenet that the Privilege can only be used to
protect information that threatens national security, and whenever possible, non-sensitive
information must be separated out for release.61 Moreover, the Supreme Court in Reynolds stated
that in instances where evidence is necessary, the Privilege should be scrutinized because
executive officers cannot control judicial evidence.62 Though the Crater majority gave lip

57

Crater, 423 F.3d at 1270.
Id.
59
Id. (noting the requirement that the official invoking the Privilege “must set forth, with enough
particularity for the court to make an informed decision, the nature of the material withheld and of the
threat to the national security should it be revealed”) (citing Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 8
(S.D.N.Y.1975)).
60
Id.
61
Id. (citing Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
62
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953) (“Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the
claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted.”); see Molerio v. F.B.I., 749 F.2d 815, 822 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (“To some degree at least, the validity of the government’s assertion must be judicially assessed.”);
Clift v. United States, 808 F. Supp. 101, 105 (D. Conn. 1991) (citing Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10 and
Molerio, 749 F.2d at 822). As early as 1953, Attorney General Herbert Brownell told President
Eisenhower that classification procedures were “‘so broadly drawn and loosely administered as to make it
possible for government officials to cover up their own mistakes and even their wrongdoing under the
guise of protecting national security.’” Garry Wills, Why the Government Can Legally Lie, THE NEW
58
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service to this idea, it did not take its responsibility to impartial review seriously.63 The
privileged information was plainly necessary to the plaintiff in light of the district court’s
conclusion that the plaintiff’s claims were unsustainable without it. In sum, the Crater majority
failed to properly review the relevant documents to determine the applicability of the Privilege.
As questionable as the specific applicability of the Privilege to the Crater documents
might have been, this issue is outside of the scope of this Article. Of far greater concern are the
larger constitutional and policy dangers, one of which was touched upon by Judge Newman and
created by decisions such as Crater.

III. The Legal and Policy Implications of Using the Privilege to Suppress Inventors’ Claims
The Crater majority’s knee-jerk acquiescence to the government’s invocation of the
Privilege might have been expected. The military has invoked the Privilege in a variety of cases,
such as soldiers’ wrongful death claims.64 Because a mere showing of a “reasonable danger” of

YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22285 (citing Brownell’s
June 15, 1953 letter to Eisenhower in KENNETH R. MEYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE
ORDERS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 145 (Princeton University Press 2002)). And Erwin Griswold,
President Nixon’s former solicitor general, stated: “It quickly becomes apparent to any person who has
considerable experience with classified material that there is massive overclassification, and that the
principal concern of the classifiers is not with national security, but rather with government
embarrassment of one sort or another.” Id. (citing Erwin N. Griswold, Op-Ed., Secrets Not Worth
Keeping, WASH. POST, Febr. 15, 1989, at A25).
63
It is unclear whether the Federal Circuit should have been applying a de novo or abuse of discretion
standard. On other privilege issues, the Federal Circuit has deferred to the law of the regional circuit. See
In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2001). But the Eighth Circuit has not
clearly addressed the issue, and, regarding other privileges, “there is a conflict among courts of appeals on
whether review of the district court’s decision is de novo or for abuse of discretion.” Id. (comparing
Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 402 (4th Cir. 1999) (“We review the district court's decision that
certain documents are subject to privilege de novo . . . ”), with In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d
175, 182 (2d Cir. 2000) (“We review a district court’s finding of waiver of the attorney-client and workproduct privileges for abuse of discretion.”)).
64
See, e.g., Schwartz v. Raytheon Co., 150 F. App’x. 627 (9th Cir. 2005) (referencing a qui tam
whistleblower action filed under the False Claims Act, claiming that military contractor failed to satisfy
requirements of a defense contract, in dismissing suit as a result of privilege); Zuckerbraun v. Gen.
Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1991) (dismissing an action brought against missile defense
systems’ manufacturers, designers, and testers for wrongful death of sailor who was killed when his ship

16

security impairment will be successful, courts usually uphold the Privilege.65 Moreover, because
courts largely defer to the executive branch with regards to the preferred approach to safeguard
security, they almost always suppress the designated information.66 This is true in nearly all
cases regarding unauthorized government use of intellectual property.67

was fired on by foreign aircraft after the invocation of the Privilege); see also Weston v. Lockheed
Missiles & Space Co., 881 F.2d 814, 815 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding the use of the Privilege in a suit by a
homosexual employee of a government contractor against the contractor and the Department of Defense
where the plaintiff claimed the government precluded the security clearance of the applicant revealing
“evidence of homosexuality”); Darby v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 74 F. App’x. 813 (9th Cir. 2003)
(consisting of a suit regarding a denial of access to a military base where the government asserted the
Privilege).
65
Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 58 (citing Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10).
66
See, e.g., Schwartz, 150 F. App’x. at 628;Weston, 881 F.2d at 815; Hudson River Sloop Clearwater,
Inc. v. Dep’t of the Navy, No. CV-86-3292, 1989 WL 50794, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. May 4, 1989) (consisting
of a challenge under the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) to the United States Navy's
decision to construct a homeport in New York harbor which would allegedly include ships with nuclear
weapons). The court upheld the Navy’s invocation of the Privilege, suppressed the documents, and
dismissed the suit. Id.
67
See, e.g., In re Under Seal, 945 F.2d 1285, 1289 (4th Cir. 1991) (upholding a protective discovery order
preventing the plaintiff from developing a factual basis for the claim of tortious interference with
business, after a former government contractor sued several government agencies and a competing
contractor, alleging that the defendant contractor and some government employees conspired to prevent
the plaintiff's contract from being renewed ); Clift v. United States, 597 F.2d 826, 829 (2d Cir. 1979);
N.S.N. Int’l Indus. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 140 F.R.D. 275, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (consisting of
a suit for a breach of contract regarding DuPont's use of NSN’s technology for military armored
personnel carriers in which the court upheld the military’s claim of the Privilege solely based on the
Secretary of Defense’s declaration and suppressed sixty-six documents) The court claimed that the
plaintiff was “in possession of substantial evidence from other sources supporting its claims.” Id. Contra
Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding that “the privilege . . . is inapplicable
when disclosure to court personnel in an in camera proceeding will not make the information public or
endanger the national security.”). For instance, in Clift v. United States, the plaintiff sought compensation
for the government’s alleged use of his patented cryptography invention (as well as compensation for a
claim under the Invention Secrecy Act, which is required when the government temporarily or
permanently places a patent application under seal). 808 F. Supp. 101, 102-03 (D. Conn. 1991). The
Second Circuit upheld the government’s assertion of the Privilege and suppressed the privileged
information, which resulted in the eventual dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. Clift, 597 F.2d at 829. In
vacating the order of dismissal, the Second Circuit stated that Clift could perhaps proceed with his case
without the requested documents or that, at some unforeseen point in time, the disclosure of the requested
documents would no longer imperil the national security. Id. at 830. Moreover, the circuit court
encouraged the government to “be as forthcoming as it can be without risk to the national interest.” Id.
Yet the district court later dismissed the claims. Clift, 808 F. Supp. at 111; see also Pollen v. United
States, 85 Ct. Cl. 673, 674 (1937) (upholding the Privilege to preclude the plaintiffs from subpoenaing the
testimony of several witnesses).
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Courts’ reluctance to consider alternative approaches to the Privilege may reflect both a
belief in the executive’s national security expertise and an abdication of making decisions with
potentially disastrous consequences. Whatever the reason, the outcome in Crater (the
suppression of all of the designated documents and dismissal of the claims) creates two
substantial problems.68 First, the uncompensated use of an inventor’s trade secrets is likely an
unconstitutional violation of the Takings Clause. Second, the abuse of inventors’ efforts will
deter small businesses from engaging in the development of military applications, which derails
a separate defense policy goal. Both problems demonstrate why national security concerns
should not diminish the judiciary’s role in checks and balances.
A. The Likelihood of a Takings Clause Violation
The government’s use of trade secrets should immediately raise a red flag as possibly
violating the Takings Clause, which prohibits the government from seizing of or trespassing on
private property without compensation.69 Indisputably, it is a longstanding Supreme Court

68

As explained above, on subsequent remand, Crater changed its theory of recovery to a “submission of
idea” claim. See supra note 55. Whereas establishment of a “trade secret” requires proof of other
commercial use of the information by the owners, an “idea” does not. Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc.,
No. 4:98CV00913 ERW, 2007 WL 4593500, at *12 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 28, 2007) However, when the
Federal Circuit addressed the Privilege, it treated the inventors’ information as potential trade secrets.
Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 423 F.3d 1260, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2005). While the circuit court
expressed skepticism of the inventors’ ability to prove their claims, there is no indication that its privilege
analysis was based on a clear rejection of the possibility that plaintiff might have possessed a trade secret.
Moreover, given the likelihood that some unauthorized government use of information will likely run
afoul of undisputed trade secrets, the Federal Circuit’s application of the Privilege continues to be of
concern. Accordingly, this Article analyzes the merit and problems of the circuit court’s decision
assuming that the inventors’ information would indeed have constituted trade secrets.
69
For almost 150 years, takings claims were limited to physical seizure or trespass. See Davida H. Isaacs,
Not All Property Is Created Equal: Why Modern Courts Resist Applying the Takings Clause to Patents,
and Why They Are Right To Do So, 15 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 1, 17 n.89, 29-30 (2007) (noting Justice
Blackmun and constitutional scholars who have described the nineteenth century understanding of the
Takings Clause). But in 1922 the doctrine of “regulatory takings” was established when the Supreme
Court declared that the Takings Clause could encompass losses to property value resulting from other
government action. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (referring to Mahon);
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doctrine that many property interests do not qualify as protected “property” under the Takings
Clause.70 Here, however, the right is clear: in 1984, the Supreme Court held in Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto that trade secrets are indeed “property” for purposes of the Takings Clause, and that
the government’s “trespasses” on an owner’s trade secrets can constitute a taking.71 In Crater, if
the complaint accurately describes Lucent’s agreement to limit its use of the plaintiff’s
information to its testing of the coupler, and if that information did constitute protectable trade
secrets, any further use of the information to produce a coupler on behalf of the government
would likely establish a taking.72 Yet, because the application of the Privilege effectively
eliminates the trade secret owner’s claim, the inventors were prevented from receiving the
compensation to which they were constitutionally entitled.
There is one possible argument against a trade secret owner’s takings claim. One of the
Court’s few clear declarations regarding takings law has been that the government need not
compensate even the complete destruction of property value if the justification comports with

see also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding that a diminution in property value could
be so great that it was “the functional equivalent of a ‘practical ouster of [the owner's] possession’”).
70
See Isaacs, supra note 69, at 36 (“[b]eing property is a necessary requirement for Takings Clause
protection, but it is not a sufficient one”). Isaacs identifies another scholar who has commented that,
“constitutional scholars know that merely classifying a legal entitlement as property is insufficient by
itself to justify providing its owner with the full panoply of constitutional remedies.” Id.
71
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984).
72
Under Missouri’s law, in order for the government to have committed a violation, the government also
would need to have reason to know that the information was misappropriated. MO. REV. STAT. §
417.453(2) (2008). If the trade secrets might still have some commercial value, the government’s
unauthorized use would not constitute a clearly compensable “total taking.” Unfortunately, the Court has
been able to clearly articulate neither what qualifies as deprivation of “all economically beneficial us[e]
of [the] property” sufficient for a total, per se taking, nor how to judge when partial economic diminution
is sufficient to constitute a taking. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (emphasis in original). “Indeed, shortly before
retiring, Justice O’Connor pulled no punches: ‘Our regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be
characterized as unified.’” Isaacs, supra note 69, at 26 n.143 (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539; Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330-31 (2002)). In any case, the evidence indicates that the inventors had not been
able to create other commercial interest in the coupler technology; thus, the trade secrets’ only apparent
value involved their Navy application.
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certain “background principles.”73 The theory is that the property owner should recognize that
such background principles have the potential to diminish the value of his property, and thus any
determination of property value without consideration of those principles is not reasonable.74 In
the real property context, this term refers to traditional property and nuisance common law.75 In
Ruckelshaus, the Court concluded that these background principles include not only the general
laws applicable to that particular type of property, but also to the regulatory environment of the
trade secrets involved.76 Assuming that a court would consider the protection of national security
to be a background principle (after all, a fundamental purpose of the national government is to
protect national security), the government’s use might not constitute a taking. However, the
background principles rationale has been applied only in the context of regulatory takings
(takings in which government legislation or regulation indirectly decreases the value of the
property), and not in the context of direct takings (takings where the government actually uses
the property).77 It would significantly change takings doctrine if the government were permitted
to seize property and assert national security as a basis for defending against a resulting takings
claim.
This brings us to the practical “catch-22”: even if the trade secret owner were to pursue a
viable takings claim, the government could presumably shut down any such claim by invoking
73

See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (stating that in cases of such “categorical” takings, “the government must
pay just compensation for such ‘total regulatory takings,’ except to the extent that ‘background principles
of nuisance and property law’ independently restrict the owner’s intended use of the property”) (citing
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1026-32 (1992)).
74
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
75
Id.
76
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1006 (noting the regulatory landscape that put Monsanto on notice that the
EPA could reveal Monsanto’s formulae of products, as well as its health, safety, and efficacy data, to
Federal agency and the public).
77
See Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597,
1659 (2008) (noting the courts’ use of the “background principles” in cabining regulatory takings); see
also BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW & LITIGATION § 3:38
(updated 2009) (noting background principles as the exception to the “the categorical rule that total
economic deprivation by regulation is a taking”).
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the Privilege. This is consistent with the policy behind the Privilege; if national security would
be threatened by the disclosure of information during a trade secret suit, the same threat would
exist if disclosure occurred during a takings suit.78
One might suggest that this menace is merely phantom because inventors usually protect
their inventions through patent rights instead of trade secret rights. Unfortunately, if inventors
are unable to receive compensation through the government’s administrative process (a
meaningful concern for inventors), then they are left with the option of asserting a section 1498
compensation claim.79 But the same problem arises: there is no reason that the government
would invoke the Privilege in a private patent litigation and not invoke it in a section 1498 case
involving the same technology (this might occur if the security risk was fabricated to protect the
contractor from liability for political reasons).80 Finally, the last recourse, a Takings Clause
78

That raises a further question: Could the invocation itself constitute a taking? Research has uncovered
no other use of the privilege that resulted in a takings claim. It remains unresolved whether any judicial
ruling can provide the basis for a takings claim. See J. Nicholas Bunch, Note, Takings, Judicial Takings,
and Patent Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1747, 1752 n.29, 1760-63 (2005) (noting that while the concept of a
judicial taking finds support in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980), and a
concurrence by Justice Stewart in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1967) and some
language in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945), (which suggested that a
court order decreeing the forfeiture of a patent as a remedy for antitrust violations would violate the
Takings Clause), “the fact remains that the Supreme Court has yet to find a case in which a judicial taking
has occurred”). Bunch argues that Federal Circuit decisions that dramatically depart from settled
precedent should give rise to judicial takings claims. Id. at 1754-55. However, there is the reasonable
concern that if any action by the judicial branch of government could instigate a constitutional taking,
then every court loss would leave the government open to liability. But the military and state secrets
privilege does appear to be an anomaly that could distinguish it from other judicial determinations—the
courts have held that once where national security is at risk, acceptance of the Privilege is not
discretionary. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953); Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs.,
Inc., 423 F.3d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Thus, there is a strong argument that the destruction of the
claim, though applied by the judiciary, is primarily an executive branch activity.
79
As indicated by the apocryphal discussion offered by one patent attorney, the government is often not
forthcoming with compensation to small businesses. See Posting of Michael L. Slonecker to Patently-O,
Patently-O TidBits, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/03/patentlyo_tidbi_2.html#comment64529722 (Mar. 27, 2007 15:23:00 CST) (comment); discussion infra at Section III.B. Lucent almost
certainly knew that it would be immunized from liability by section 1498 for any use that it made of the
coupler under its government contract. Therefore, it had little motivation to avoid infringement.
80
The Court of Federal Claims is a public forum just like any district or circuit court. See Pollen v. United
States, 85 Ct. Cl. 673, 678 (1937) (noting that the jurisdiction of the court was predicated on the 1910
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claim, would likely run into the same problem as described above: the government’s invocation
of the Privilege would effectively preclude a patent holder from recovering any damages.81
In sum, by permitting the government’s application of the Privilege to eradicate the
plaintiff’s claims, the court wrongly prevented the plaintiff from obtaining constitutionally
mandated redress for the government’s use of the plaintiff’s trade secrets. Moreover, even a
direct claim under the Takings Clause would presumably be thwarted by the Privilege. Thus, as
applied in Crater, the Privilege would be more powerful than constitutional protections. And yet
while one might be able to engage in a debate as to if (and when) national security should trump
constitutional guarantees, the court failed even to consider this imbalance. If the Crater majority

statutory predecessor to section 1498). In Pollen, the plaintiffs sought recompense for the Navy’s
appropriation of two devices, the Federal Court of Claims upheld the privilege to preclude plaintiffs from
subpoenaing the testimony of several witnesses—one a government witness and one a private witness
who obtained information through a “confidential relationship” with the military. Id. at 680. At the time,
the Judicial Code permitted “[the] head of any department [to] refuse and omit to comply with any
[subpoena from the court] for information or papers, when, in his opinion, such compliance would be
injurious to the public interest.” Id. at 677. The court rejected the argument that the Government waived
its right to invoke a privilege which would effectively vitiate the claim, concluding that the section
provides only an opportunity to sue the government, using the same evidentiary rules as in any other
court. Id. The court also rejected the assertion that application of the Privilege would violate plaintiffs’
due process rights. Id. at 676. It wasn’t until far after Pollen—to be exact, in the 1999 Supreme Court’s
Florida Prepaid decision—that it was even clear that a patent holder could, in fact, assert due process
claims. [cite]
81
In any case, getting past the Privilege hurdle would hardly be a guarantee of success of such a claim,
because the Federal Circuit recently held that patents are not “property” for purposes of the Takings
Clause. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam), cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 2936 (2007). That ruling was highly controversial, with a substantial number of practitioners
and scholars strongly arguing that the earlier Supreme Court statements mandated a contrary result. There
were some expectations that either the Federal Circuit would reverse this panel decision en banc, or that
the Supreme Court would accept certiorari and reverse the lower court. Neither happened. Isaacs, supra
note 69, at 13 (“[A] gambler might have reasonably wagered that the Federal Circuit would grant a
rehearing en banc and overrule the panel.”). Compare Isaacs, supra note 69, at 43 (noting that if patents
are considered federal benefits, they should not be protected by the Takings Clause), with Adam Mossoff,
Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings
Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 690 (2007) (arguing that patents are Takings Clause property); Shubha
Ghosh, Reconciling Property Rights and States’ Rights in the Information Age: Federalism, the
“Sovereig’s Prerogative” and Takings after College Savings, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 17, 41 n.163 (1999)
(stating patents are property for purposes of the Takings Clause).
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recognized these conflicting obligations, they might have considered alternatives, such as those
discussed in Part III, to the drastic result of denying inventors the ability to obtain relief.
B. Undermining Small Businesses’ Incentive to Innovate Runs Counter to the
Department of Defense’s National Defense Strategy
As explained above, the Crater court’s application of the Privilege created a highly
troubling constitutional problem. Given Judge Newman’s previous vehement support for an
inventor’s right to Takings Clause protection, one might have expected that she would have
directed her attention in Crater to the potential Takings Clause violation.82 Yet Judge Newman
focused on another effect of the Privilege: the danger of discouraging military innovation.
While expressly acknowledging the importance of protecting military and state secrets
from the nation’s enemies, Judge Newman declared that, “[a]t the same time, persons who serve
the government must have a reasonable way of resolving disputes.” 83 Providing the Crater
inventors with legal recourse was not simply altruistic; rather, the fair resolution of disputes is
necessary to ensure the government’s continued access to the private sector’s talents.84 Judge
Newman recognized that patent and trade secret protections exist to provide incentives to
potential inventors. Without such protections, others would simply copy an invention and undersell the original inventor. The right to temporarily charge monopoly prices encourages people to
invest more money and effort into innovation. If government assertions of the Privilege are
permitted to destroy such a monopoly’s value, inventors will lose this incentive.
82

Upon the Federal Circuit’s refusal to re-hear Zoltek en banc, it was Judge Newman who offered a
strong dissent criticizing the Federal Circuit for failing to protect patentholders’ property rights. See
Isaacs, supra note 69, at 14 (noting that in her dissent to the denial to rehear Zoltek en banc, Judge
Newman argued that recognition of the right to a Takings Clause remedy for trade secrets while rejecting
a similar remedy for patents was in conflict with Supreme Court and lower court precedent that referred
to patents as “property”).
83
Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 423 F.3d 1260, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1218
(2006).
84
Id. at 1271.
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Society may be willing to forego the creation of some relatively inconsequential
inventions, but as Judge Newman indicated, it cannot afford to intentionally remove the
intellectual property incentives for inventions with military application (such as the coupler).85
Judge Newman is not the first jurist to recognize the danger created by precluding inventors from
obtaining recompense for their inventions. Even while upholding the government’s assertion of
the Privilege in Clift, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the destruction of inventors’
claims conflicts with the policy goal of encouraging inventors to pursue inventions with military
potential.86
Most problematically, the disincentive caused by the dismissal of such claims falls
disproportionately on smaller inventors. Permitting the Privilege to thwart the small inventors’
incentive to innovate is particularly disturbing because the Department of Defense has recently
recognized that such inventors are playing an increasingly important role in national security.
Their significance is apparent in the “Revolution in Military Affairs” report, which represents the
integration of advanced communications, computer, and information technology into military
hardware and military institutions.87 Much of this newer technology lies outside the expertise of
traditional members of the defense-industrial complex.88 Consequently, the Defense Department
has suggested that it expects to rely more on non-traditional providers (which tend to include
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smaller inventive entities) than it has in the past.89 This expectation of a shift in innovation’s
origin is the result of Pentagon studies conducted in the early 2000s. These studies emphasized
the need to retain technological superiority in numerous areas in order to maintain “warfighting
leadership.”90 They specifically called for the United States to expand access to innovative
technologies available in the commercial realm, as this access would increasingly provide
capability and cost advantages to the Defense Department.91 Moreover, these studies concluded
that gaining the benefit of private sector innovation depends on ensuring competition from firms
that are not part of the traditional defense industrial base.92 One study identified twenty-four
small or non-traditional firms that could be expected to contribute to maintaining U.S.
technological advantages.93 As a result, the Department of Defense has made the transformation
of the defense-industrial base by reaching out to smaller inventive entities a priority.94
There is no question that the government should be encouraging small businesses to
invest more in innovation with potential military applications. However, as some scholars have
noted, traditional members of the defense-industrial complex have substantial advantages over
newcomers.95 Larger, well-established companies are regularly involved in producing numerous
goods and services used by the government.96 These companies benefit from their familiarity
with the remarkably time consuming, complex landscape of defense procurement. Indeed, former
89
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Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted that the delay caused by the process of defense
procurement benefited larger companies because they have access to lawyers and lobbyists that
smaller companies do not.97 Moreover, government officials are generally interested in
maintaining good relations with these regular suppliers. These companies further ensure
favorable treatment by employing former Department of Defense and military personnel.98 As a
result, even when one of these large companies holds the intellectual property rights to an
invention useful for a military system and is not the party contracted to produce that system, the
military is likely to agree to license that invention rather than try to undercut one of its regular
suppliers.
By contrast, smaller businesses do not have the political and economic influence to
compel the government to license their intellectual property. Instead, they are left feeling
impotent, and full of incumbent fear. Indeed, one commenter on the well-respected Patently-O
blog described this impotence and incumbent fear through the following apocryphal dialogue:
Patentee sends letter to [the government] contractor saying “You are infringing
my patent.” [sic]
Contractor sends letter to patentee saying “Pound sand, weasel. Go take it up with
the [the government,] ‘cuz it ain’t my problem.”
Patentee send letter to [the government] saying “My patent is being infringed by
the work being done under your contract with the contractor.”
[The government] replies “So sue me. I will consign your claim to a ‘black hole’
where it will languish for years as an administrative claim.”
Patentee send letter saying “Here is my claim.”
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[The government] replies “Got it. We will get back to you sometime in the next
decade of [sic] so. Hopefully, by then you will be under Chapter 11.”99
To the extent that this view is prevalent among small businesses, they will anticipate the
need to rely on legal recourse rather than clout. As a result, the incentive for smaller companies
to develop technology beneficial to the Department of Defense will depend on robust intellectual
property rights.
The government wants small inventors of newer technology to focus their innovative
efforts with defense applications in mind, and holds out the promise of substantial government
sales as motivation. Innovators attentive to that prospect could be dissuaded by the possibility
that, if the fruit of their efforts are utilized without authorization, their avenues of recourse could
be blocked through the government’s use of the Privilege. Therein lies the problem: the
government is anticipating an increased reliance on small entity innovation to provide key
components of many forthcoming national defense systems, yet its use of the Privilege to foster
uncertainty in such entities is dangerously counterproductive.
In sum, as Judge Newman argued: “[f]air resolution of disputes is necessary to ensure the
government’s continued access to the private sector’s talents.”100 Unexpected termination of
disputes through the Privilege undermines such a fair resolution. However, it is even more
problematic than perhaps Judge Newman realized, because the government is expecting to rely
more heavily on individual and smaller entities for much of its new defense technology. These
groups lack the political clout and long-term institutional relationships to ensure that the military
will properly license their technology. As a result, unless they can rely on having their
intellectual property protected, small inventors may be disinclined to pursue inventions sought
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after by the military, or to make their non-patented civilian inventions available to the military.
Courts have failed to appreciate that by permitting the Privilege to effectively end these cases,
they are discouraging innovation from precisely the groups that the government has indicated it
is most interested in encouraging.

IV. Resolving the Competing Needs to Ensure National Security and Encourage Inventors
One might argue that the discouragement of inventors, especially smaller inventors, is an
unfortunate but inevitable disadvantage of the use of the Privilege. But, obviously, it would be
preferable to avoid that consequence to the greatest extent possible. Furthermore, while it is true
that Reynolds suggests that the need to protect military secrets trumps the evidentiary needs of
some plaintiffs101, the possibility of a Takings Clause violation cannot be easily shrugged off.
Thus, faced with possible constitutional violations and long-term security concerns, it is within
the discretion of, and incumbent upon, Congress and the courts to fashion a response to the
invocation of the Privilege short of a complete bar to disclosure of the information.102 This
approach, briefly mentioned by Judge Newman in her partial dissent, deserves further
consideration.103
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Similar executive use (and arguably abuse) of the Privilege in cases regarding terrorism
and national security investigations104 prompted a bipartisan group of Senators to propose a bill,
the State Secrets Protection Act, which sought to provide guidance to federal courts considering
the assertion of the state secrets privilege.105 As expected, the majority report asserted that the
bill would have “codifie[d] the principle that state secrets assertions are justifiable.” But the
report emphasized that Executive Branch is not given the last word on use of the Privilege;
rather, “[t]he court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim
of privilege.”106 Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, Congress would have required that
the judicial review take place at a higher level of scrutiny -- shifting the standard of consideration
from “utmost deference” to “substantial weight.”107 The majority report on the bill explained
that, “the government’s assertions deserve weight and respect, but they do not deserve a reprieve
from the rigorous, independent judicial scrutiny demanded by our adjudicatory system.”108In
order to effectively engage in such scrutiny, the bill would have required judges to review the
allegedly privileged evidence before dismissing a case, instead of relying on the government’s
104
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assertions as to the nature of the proposed privileged information.109 By requiring that that all
purportedly privileged documents be submitted to the court for an in camera hearings,110 which if
necessary, could be heard by cleared special masters,111 the bill would have demonstrated that
Congress rejected the Executive Branch’s frequent argument that analysis by a court would, in
and of itself, impair national security either because of the public’s access to court records or
because of the decisionmaker’s lack of security clearance).112
Furthermore, the majority report also repudiated the notion that adversarial examination
of the Privilege’s invocation, in and of itself, would have regularly undermined national security.
The bill would have discouraged attempts by the government to seek ex parte hearings by
instructing the government to provide, where possible, opposing parties’ attorneys with the
needed national security clearances;113 where such clearances are not possible (presumably
because of the attorneys’ background), the court would have been authorized to appoint a
guardian ad litem to represent the private party’s interests.114 Finally, when material evidence
was found to be privileged, the legislation would have compelled a court to order the government
to create, if possible, a non-privileged substitute for the evidence, such as an unclassified
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summary or a redacted version; government refusal to do so would oblige a court to decide the
relevant issue of fact or law against the government.115
Some combination of these procedural approaches has been used in prior individual
cases. However, as demonstrated by the Crater courts’ failure to review the alleged privileged
information, these “best practices” have not been consistently implemented, and thus
codification is worthwhile.116
Unquestionably, these would have been significant improvements towards ensuring that
courts approach a government assertion of the Privilege with both greater skepticism and
oversight. Unfortunately, this legislation died at the end of the 2008-2009 Congressional session.
However, in any case, this legislation failed to protect inventors as well as it could have. In
particular, the bill offered no recourse to inventors once the court concludes that material is
privileged. Indeed, the majority report asserted that the bill would have provided a complete bar
to the use of privileged items in discovery or as evidence.117 Why similar procedural mechanisms
considered sufficient to resolve the Privilege issue could not be applied to the underlying
litigation is unexplained by the majority report. By using some of those mechanisms, inventors’
claims could proceed without risking national security in some situations. For instance,
permitting the case to proceed in camera, with the documents kept under seal, would eliminate
the concern that the information would be revealed as part of the public record.118 If the
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government expresses concern that the information could still be too easily accessed, the court
could add restrictions such as especially secure storage and encryption. Further, the entire
proceeding could be held at a closed venue.119 With regards to any concerns about appropriate
personnel resource, private experts with the necessary clearances could be sought.120
The same security checks that could authorize opposing counsel for the Privilege hearing
would presumably permit those attorneys to have access to try the case.121 Alternatively, the
court could order the government to provide a plaintiff with suitable counsel. While few military
attorneys have the requisite patent litigation background, the relative scarcity of these cases
should make this option feasible. Plainly, this option would be less desirable; inventors would
obviously prefer to choose their own counsel. Nonetheless, this alternative is likely to be more
palatable to plaintiffs than to be stuck with unsupportable claims as a result of the suppression of
crucial information.
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One critical determinant as to whether these safeguards would be sufficient is the type of
alleged invention at issue. In some cases, disclosure of the government’s use of such devices to
security-cleared litigants would appear unlikely to jeopardize national security. As Judge
Newman noted, there may be areas of extreme sensitivity that cannot risk any judicial exposure
(such as the Manhattan Project). A situation similar to the hypothetical disclosure of the
Manhattan Project did, in fact, arise in Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Department of
Navy.122 In Hudson River Sloop, more than ten environmental groups filed suit, asserting that the
Navy had failed to engage in the proper environmental protection analysis prior to docking
nuclear-armed vessels in New York ports.123 The Navy claimed that the identity of nucleararmed (as opposed to conventionally armed) ships was confidential, and a judicial decision in
favor of the plaintiffs would breach national security by indicating to observers which ships
carried nuclear weapons.124 As the outcome of the suit could not remain secret, the Navy argued,
the proceeding itself posed the threat of a violation of national security.125 The court agreed,
acknowledging that while in camera proceedings might provide some protection against public
scrutiny, other parts of judicial proceedings are public and could result in a confidentiality
breach.126 Although the court could have ordered that its final determination remain sealed and
placed a gag order on the plaintiff groups, given the number of people involved, as well as the
yes-or-no nature of the confidentiality (the ships did or did not carry nuclear weapons), such a
ruling was arguably appropriate.
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It is true that there may be circumstances in which the danger is too great to justify
providing even security-cleared inventors access to the privileged information. Consider, for
instance, the cryptographic device at issue in Clift.127 Concealment of cryptography is so critical
to intelligence gathering that any possibility of its disclosure, even a small, carefully controlled
one, is a significant threat to national security. In light of this, a court might reasonably conclude
that no amount of procedural safeguards might be considered sufficient to permit the government
to prove its use of an alternative design. By contrast, for the Crater coupler and most other
inventions, merely elevating the protections afforded to the evidence would suffice.128 The Crater
coupler was intended to be used on underground fiber optic cables; the location of such cables
themselves is not generally known, and they are usually miles under the ocean. Moreover,
knowledge that Crater had prevailed in litigation, thus establishing that the United States uses a
particular kind of coupler to connect cables in secret locations on the ocean floor, is almost
certainly useless to the nation’s enemies. Details will vary from case to case, but the Privilege
does not justify the quashing of all such litigation.
Moreover, in other cases, the sensitive information at issue is often already acknowledged
to be in the possession of the inventor. For instance, in Halpern, the plaintiff asserted his claims
under the Invention Secrecy Act; the purported privileged information was the patent application
which the inventor himself submitted.129 Responding to the government’s invocation of the
Privilege, the court ordered the case to proceed in camera. The court found the government’s
argument that any use of the application would constitute an unacceptable risk to national
security unconvincing because the inventor was only seeking evidentiary proof of the submission
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of his own application.130 Likewise, where the government had appropriated the patented
invention as its own, the essence of the government’s device is presumably already known to the
patent holder. Even if some minor modifications were made to the device, redaction to withhold
those changes should avert any concern, and in such cases, the government’s protestations ring
hollow.
In sum, courts should be obliged to consider whether the particular circumstances, such
as those in Crater, would permit it to address any legitimate security concerns using the
aforementioned procedural mechanisms rather than the draconian response of suppressing the
material completely. There may be circumstances in which even the enhanced procedural
safeguards described in the bill, if applied beyond the Privilege hearing to actual litigation,
would be insufficient to defend governmental interests. In that small fraction of national security
situations, the complete suppression of sensitive information will be warranted. However, neither
the Crater court nor the now-defunct bill offered any explanation for the failure to apply these
types of procedural mechanisms to most actions. Along with the constitutional and long-term
national security problems caused by the destruction of claims, the courts’ fundamental
obligation to hear valid claims should compel them to consider these alternatives instead of
simply rubber-stamping the government’s request for an extreme response to the invocation of
the Privilege.

V. Conclusion
The result in Lucent v. Crater is every inventor’s nightmare: a valuable idea, stolen, with
no recourse. Unfortunately, rather than carefully parse out possible alternative approaches to
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recognizing the Privilege, the Federal Circuit permitted the Privilege to defeat the inventors’
claims. In the context of claims regarding unauthorized military use of inventions, this reaction
has the potential to engender several serious problems.
As demonstrated in Crater, under some circumstances, the suppression may disregard
inventors’ constitutional rights. Where the government has misappropriated (directly or
indirectly) a trade secret, the owner has a constitutional right to compensation for the taking.
Suppression of the evidence needed to prove the owner’s trade secret claim removes this
constitutionally mandated remedy. To add salt to the constitutional wound, any direct takings
claim would generally fall victim to the same problem.
Equally problematic is the deterring effect of the destruction of inventors’ claims
(whether patent or trade secret) that will fall disproportionately on smaller businesses. This result
is alarming, as it directly conflicts with the Department of Defense’s contention that smaller
businesses will need to produce a substantial share of the next generation of defense technology
in order to maximize the nation’s security. This is at odds with the Department’s stated goals of
encouraging small businesses to consider the Department of Defense as a potential customer for
technological innovation. Smaller businesses, already facing substantial obstacles in breaking
into the defense procurement market, lack the political influence and long-term institutional
relationships to ensure that the military will properly license their technology. As a result, these
businesses must rely primarily on legal protection, rather than political or economic clout, to
vindicate their intellectual property rights. If the application of the Privilege strips these smaller
inventors of this protection, they may be disinclined to pursue inventions sought after by the
military. In essence, the nation’s long-term defense strategy is being taken hostage by a shortterm litigation strategy.
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Given these grave problems, as well as the judicial system’s fundamental obligation to
hear valid claims whenever possible, it is incumbent upon courts to consider more carefully
whether the termination of most such litigation is truly required, or whether, in the presence of
appropriate procedural mechanisms, some innovators could be permitted to pursue their claims. .
Indeed, recently proposed legislation would have instructed courts to use a variety of protective
procedural mechanisms to protect sensitive information during the determination of the
application of the Privilege. Yet the legislation inexplicably would have also authorized, without
apparent further consideration, complete suppression of any information eventually deemed
privileged. This result appears unnecessary, as most of those same mechanisms could be applied
equally well to an entire litigation proceeding.
It is true that there still may be the rare situation in which either the particularly sensitive
nature of the invention, or the strategic inferences suggested by a judgment, indicates that no
procedural safeguards would be sufficient to protect defense interests. In such a circumstance,
there may be no recourse other than to terminate the litigation regardless of the immediate cost to
the inventors and long-term costs to other government goals. But in contrary situations, which
are likely to be more common, courts should search for an approach that will protect sensitive
information without forcing inventors to have to pay the price (literally and figuratively) for the
government’s use of the Privilege.
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